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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts was correct when he remarked that “[t]he
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race.”1 The use of race in admissions decisions to
undergraduate and graduate institutions is a subject that has long roiled the
Supreme Court.2 Most affirmative action challenges have focused on
attacking affirmative action programs that are already in place.3 In
November 2012, the Sixth Circuit addressed an ironic affirmative action
question: whether a state that places a ban on the use of affirmative action
programs violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 The Sixth Circuit’s decision invalidating Michigan’s ban on
affirmative action has split with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Coalition
for Economic Equity v. Wilson, which addressed the same question but
came to the opposite conclusion.5
1. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
709-10, 747-48 (2007) (striking down the use of racial classifications to assign students
to schools).
2. Compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (noting that a
narrowly tailored race-based admissions policy must not be a quota system), with
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1978) (holding that the
University of California’s race-based “set-aside” program was unconstitutional but that
a complete ban on the consideration of race was inappropriate).
3. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 311 (challenging the University of Michigan
Law School’s use of race in admissions decisions).
4. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights &
Fight for Equal. v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 2012)
[hereinafter Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action] (en banc) (using a political structure
approach to invalidate Michigan’s affirmative action ban).
5. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 711 (9th Cir. 1997)
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This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should reverse the Sixth
Circuit’s decision in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.6 The Court
should also hold that the Hunter-Seattle doctrine was not triggered under
the factual circumstances at issue in the case before the Sixth Circuit where
a statewide referendum repealed existing affirmative action programs.7
Further, the Court should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Wilson and
analyze the ban at issue in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action using the
more expansive traditional approach to equal protection.8 Part II examines
the nature of permissible affirmative action plans under current Supreme
Court doctrine and explains the circuit split.9 Part III argues that the Sixth
Circuit incorrectly found Michigan’s initiative banning affirmative action
unconstitutional by applying the Hunter-Seattle test.10 Part IV offers a
policy argument for abandonment of the Hunter-Seattle test.11 Part V
concludes that affirmative action bans are consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause and questions the continued relevance of the HunterSeattle doctrine.12

(holding that Proposition 209 banning the use of affirmative action did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause under a traditional equal protection analysis).
6. See infra Part V (concluding that Supreme Court review of the Sixth Circuit’s
decision is an ideal opportunity to critically examine the doctrinal underpinnings of that
decision). Two developments at the Supreme Court occurred while this Comment was
in publication. First, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 133 S. Ct.
1633 (2013). Oral arguments were held on Tuesday, October 15, 2013, and a decision
is expected in 2014. Second, the Supreme Court decided Fisher v. University of Texas
in June 2013. That case reiterated the continued vitality of Grutter, without expressly
affirming it, because the issue of Grutter’s legitimacy was not squarely before the
Court. Fisher held that the Fifth Circuit incorrectly applied strict scrutiny to the
university’s use of race in its admissions policy and vacated the Fifth Circuit’s opinion
and remanded. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421-22 (2013).
7. See infra Part III (discussing why the Hunter-Seattle test was not triggered).
8. See infra Part III (arguing that the Ninth Circuit was correct in finding the
Hunter-Seattle test inapplicable).
9. See infra Part II (outlining two approaches to equal protection doctrine).
10. See infra Part III (arguing that the Sixth Circuit applied a strained reading of
the Hunter-Seattle test).
11. See infra Part IV (discussing the potential harm of the Hunter-Seattle test).
12. See infra Part V (concluding that the Hunter-Seattle test could be overruled by
the Supreme Court).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss2/8

4

Bean: Have We Reached Grutter's "Logical End Point?" The Fight Over Sta

2014]

HAVE WE REACHED GRUTTER’S LOGICAL END POINT?

489

II. BACKGROUND
A. Permissible Use of Race in Affirmative Action Programs Under Bakke,
Grutter, and Gratz
In the education context, affirmative action programs provide an
advantage to minority applicants in the admissions process.13 Affirmative
action programs are recognized racial classifications that presumptively
violate the Equal Protection Clause.14 Under the Equal Protection Clause,
racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and must be narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interest.15 Despite the invalidity of
affirmative action programs, the Supreme Court permits them as a remedy
for past discrimination.16 Consequently, affirmative action programs are an
exception to the general rule of equality required by the Equal Protection
Clause.17
Though the Supreme Court allows affirmative action programs, there are
well-defined limitations on how such programs may operate.18 First, race
may only be considered as a “plus” in conjunction with other
characteristics in a student’s file.19 This means that race cannot be the sole
factor determining admission.20
This requirement ensures that all
applicants receive comprehensive review.21 In defining the contours of
permissible affirmative action programs, the Court prohibits procedures

13. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319 (1978)
(noting that affirmative action programs create “preferred groups”).
14. See id. at 289 (characterizing the school’s program as “undeniably” a racial
classification).
15. See, e.g., id. at 291 (reiterating that race is a suspect class); see also Fisher v.
Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013) (holding that a school’s alleged good faith
in using racial classifications in school admissions cannot be accepted as fact by a court
because strict scrutiny requires the court to analyze actively an asserted use of race).
16. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324-35 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the
State may use race for remedial purposes).
17. See id. at 289 n.27 (majority opinion) (explaining that affirmative action is a
facially explicit use of race).
18. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d 466, 498 (6th Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (noting that racial classifications are acceptable only in
certain circumstances).
19. See, e.g., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-19 (emphasizing that using race as a plus
does not exclude non-minority applicants from seats set aside only for minority
applicants).
20. See id. at 317 (noting that the objective of such a plus is to evaluate all
candidates fairly).
21. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003) (holding that candidate
review must be extremely individualized).
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that create quotas for minority applicants.22
One of the more important limitations on affirmative action programs is
that they must be limited in time.23 In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court
approved the law school’s use of race but stressed that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires elimination of policies, like affirmative action, that
embody racial classifications.24 This is because all racial classifications are
presumptively invalid.25 The Court noted that California, Florida, and
Washington have banned affirmative action in the same way that Michigan
did with Proposal 2 in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.26 The
Court’s approval of state-level affirmative action bans in Grutter suggests
consistency with the Court’s policy of eliminating racial classifications and
reinforces the necessity of an end to those programs.27
Affirmative action programs take various forms, but a common scheme
is one that sets aside a number of seats for minority groups, like the policy
at issue in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.28 Other
policies, such as the one at issue in Gratz v. Bollinger, use a point system
under which minority students are awarded a set number of points that
places them ahead of their non-minority competitors.29 Such policies
prevent a certain number of seats from being filled by non-minority
applicants.30 Thus, in some circumstances, an otherwise qualified nonminority applicant will be denied admission notwithstanding the
availability of seats.31

22. See, e.g., id. (finding that the law school’s consideration of race without
assigning points was not a quota).
23. See id. at 341-42 (requiring that affirmative action programs have sunset
provisions).
24. See id. at 342 (declining to preserve a justification for racial preferences in the
Fourteenth Amendment).
25. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003)
(noting that racial classifications are more suspect than gender classifications).
26. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343 (expecting the need for affirmative action
programs to be gone in twenty-five years).
27. See id. at 342 (approving of race-neutral policies to further a compelling
interest in diversity).
28. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275 (1978) (noting
that there was a specific number of minority slots in each class).
29. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 255 (2003) (discussing how the
University went through several iterations of its point system).
30. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276 (noting that there were four unfilled seats for which
Mr. Bakke could not compete).
31. See id. (mentioning the strength of Mr. Bakke’s scores).
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B. Two Approaches to Analyzing the Equal Protection Clause: The
Traditional Approach and the Political Structure Approach
Courts have used two approaches to analyze equal protection issues.32
Under the traditional approach, the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause
is to prevent racial discrimination and classifications based on race.33 This
view is rooted in the idea that racial distinctions are often made to
subjugate certain races and ethnicities.34 Given this purpose, if a law treats
an individual unequally on the basis of race, then that individual has a
claim for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.35
The second approach, known as the political structure doctrine, holds
that the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to prevent the State from
inhibiting minority groups from enacting beneficial legislation as compared
to other groups seeking the same or similar legislation.36 This view
disfavors laws that obstruct the ability of minority groups to advocate for
legislation of importance to them by moving the process used to pass such
laws from a lower level of government, such as a local school board, to a
higher level of government, such as the statewide electorate.37 The
political structure approach presumes that such obstructions are racial
classifications that violate the Equal Protection Clause.38
1. The Traditional Approach: Elimination of Racial Discrimination
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
the states afford all citizens “equal protection of the law.”39 Underlying
equal protection law is the notion that the political and social institutions of
the United States are based on the principle of equality.40 When the State
32. See, e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d 466, 504 (6th Cir.
2012) (en banc) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (referring to a traditional “approach” to equal
protection).
33. See id. (discussing how racial classifications can be invalidated by showing a
discriminatory purpose).
34. See, e.g., id. at 512 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (finding that all racial
classifications are suspect because there is no way to distinguish between benign and
discriminatory uses of race).
35. See, e.g., id. at 504 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (noting that a facial racial
classification triggers strict scrutiny).
36. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982)
(discussing the implications of allocating political power on the basis of race).
37. See id. (noting that such a restructuring burdens racial minorities).
38. See id. at 483 (holding that removing the power to pass or address racial
legislation violates equal protection).
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (protecting all citizens from denial of their
equal protection rights by the states).
40. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (noting that
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implements a law that treats one group differently than another on the basis
of race, the Equal Protection Clause is violated.41
As equal protection law evolved, the Supreme Court found that certain
classifications of citizens affected by legislation were more suspect than
others.42 The most notable suspect classification is race, because race is an
immutable characteristic.43 The suspect nature of race as a means of
legislative classification dates as far back as the Court’s decision in Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, which struck down an ordinance preventing the operation
of laundries in buildings made of wood.44 The Supreme Court found that
the law unfairly targeted Chinese-owned laundries because their laundries
were often located in buildings made of wood.45 The Court held that equal
protection must apply regardless of race, thus signaling, at this early stage,
a judicial suspicion of laws implicating race.46
The Court’s later opinions dealing with race firmly establish that race is
a suspect classification.47 The Court holds that race is suspect since racial
distinctions stigmatize minorities solely because they belong to a certain
race, a decision over which they have no control.48 In Shaw v. Reno, a case
not dealing with affirmative action, the Court found that the North Carolina
legislature adopted a reapportionment plan that was meant to segregate
voters on the basis of race to disenfranchise minority voters.49 The Court
denounced all racial classifications because they condone inequality.50
The culmination of years of equal protection litigation led to the

racial distinctions are “odious” to equality).
41. See, e.g., Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997)
(discussing why preferring one group disadvantages those not belonging to that group).
42. See id. at 701 (noting the Supreme Court’s long-standing belief in the suspect
nature of race).
43. See id. (suggesting that individuals have no control over their ancestral origins,
meaning that ancestry is immutable).
44. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 362 (1886) (noting that laundry
licenses were only granted to Caucasians such that Chinese-owned laundries would be
forced to operate without licenses in derogation of the law).
45. See id. (discussing how the ordinance operated in reality).
46. See id. at 363 (citing race, color, and nationality).
47. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (characterizing racial
classifications as “especially suspect”).
48. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (suggesting that racial
hostility follows from race-based laws).
49. See id. at 658 (holding that the appellants had an equal protection claim based
on disenfranchisement).
50. See id. at 657 (emphasizing the “lasting harm” created by racial
classifications).
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traditional approach to the Equal Protection Clause.51 Given the suspect
nature of race, the Court has held that the purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause is to prevent government-sanctioned discrimination based on race.52
Given this purpose, whenever the State uses race to distinguish between
individuals, those harmed by the racial classification suffer an equal
protection violation.53
The traditional approach to the Equal Protection Clause is broad and
flexible because states have wide latitude to determine the best method to
eradicate racial classifications.54 This approach evaluates the substance of
a law and determines whether or not it achieves the directive of eliminating
racial discrimination or whether it uses an impermissible racial
classification.55 Under this approach, a law that prevents discrimination
based on race arguably complies with the constitutional directive to
eliminate racial classifications because it does exactly that by prohibiting
racial distinctions.56
Under the traditional approach, the repeal of legislation touching in some
way on race does not create an invalid racial classification that violates
equal protection.57 This rule comes from Crawford v. Board of Education,
where the Supreme Court held that the “mere repeal” of legislation dealing
with race that was not required by the Constitution in the first place,
without more, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.58 In Crawford,
California voters halted desegregation by amending the state constitution to
prevent the State from using busing or school reassignments.59 The Court
found that the legislation did not trigger strict scrutiny because it did not
51. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (referring to the
“central purpose” of equal protection).
52. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (noting that racial
classifications reflect racial prejudice).
53. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 230 (1995)
(holding that race automatically implicates the Equal Protection Clause).
54. Cf. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997)
(suggesting that the rational basis standard allows most laws to stand).
55. See id. (contrasting traditional equal protection with political structure equal
protection and suggesting that the traditional approach is broader).
56. See id. (suggesting that a ban on racial preferences is not a suspect racial
classification because the state cannot create preferences based on race).
57. See generally Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d 466, 488 (6th Cir.
2012) (en banc) (illuminating the difference between a repeal and political
restructuring).
58. See Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 538-39 (1982) (noting that some
racial policies are not constitutionally required).
59. See id. at 532 (discussing how the legislation attempted to align the power of
state courts with those of the federal courts).
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embody a racial classification and upheld the law under rational basis.60
The Court emphasized that when a repeal leaves intact the ability of the
State or its voters to reinstate the repealed law, the repeal does not fall
below constitutional standards.61 Thus, under Crawford, legislation that
solely repeals existing laws that address race and were not constitutionally
required in the first place, without removing the power of the State to
reinstate those laws, triggers rational basis and will likely be upheld under
that standard of review.62
2. Obstructions to Achieving Beneficial Legislation Through the Political
Process: The Hunter-Seattle Doctrine
Another approach to equal protection law known as the political
structure doctrine emerged from the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Hunter v. Erickson.63 The
political structure approach focuses on the right of all citizens to petition
the state for legislation that is beneficial to them.64 Under this approach,
the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to ensure that an electoral
majority does not alter the political channels to make it more difficult for
minority groups to achieve legislation of importance to them.65 An oftused metaphor for conceptualizing this view of equal protection posits that
if two competitors run the same race, it is unfair to make one competitor
run farther than the other.66 Thus, the political structure approach
safeguards equality in the political process.67
A two-pronged test emerged from Hunter and Seattle: a law denies equal
60. See id. at 536-37 (recognizing that the challenged law did not have to support a
compelling state interest because only rational basis applied).
61. See id. at 541 (noting that some legislative actions are more than repeals and
others are less than repeals).
62. See id. at 538 (referring to the repeal as “simple”).
63. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 460, 462-64, 487
(1982) (holding unconstitutional a voter initiative enjoining the school district’s use of
busing and school reassignments to foster desegregation); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385, 387, 393 (1969) (concluding that an amendment to Akron, Ohio’s charter
repealing a fair housing ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause).
64. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 393 (equating vote dilution with schemes obstructing
processes to achieve favorable legislation).
65. See, e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich.,
652 F.3d 607, 614 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting the importance of ensuring a fair political
process).
66. See id. (emphasizing that a voting minority has a disadvantage in the political
process).
67. See id. (noting that everyone must have equal opportunity to advocate for
change in educational policies).
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protection if it (1) has a racial focus, and (2) reorders a political process to
significantly burden minority interests by impeding them from being able
to achieve legislation that is beneficial to them.68 Under the first prong of
the Hunter-Seattle test, the legislation must have a racial focus.69 A policy,
political, educational, or otherwise, that “inures primarily to the benefit of
the minority and is designed for that purpose” has a racial focus.70
Affirmative action programs increase the presence of racial minorities.71
Minorities are therefore given a benefit by the use of affirmative action
programs.72 Accordingly, because affirmative action is designed to
increase minority enrollment, thereby conferring a benefit on racial
minorities, such policies can likely be characterized as having a racial focus
under the Hunter-Seattle test.73
The second prong of the Hunter-Seattle test requires a reordering of a
political process to impose significant burdens on the interests of a minority
group.74 When a law makes it more difficult for racial minorities to
advocate for their interests compared to other groups seeking similar
legislation, political power has been realigned along racial lines.75 The
burdens accompanying this realignment need only be more significant than
burdens faced by other groups attempting to produce similar changes
through identical political channels.76
In considering whether a law reallocates political power to burden
minorities, Hunter and Seattle apply where the ability of a minority to pass
legislation is moved from a local legislative body to the general electorate
68. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d 466, 477 n.2 (6th Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (defining a burden as an obstruction to minority use of a political process to
achieve legislation).
69. See id. at 471 (noting that the policy must be drawn for racial purposes).
70. See id. at 472 (noting that desegregation has a racial focus).
71. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (explaining the law
school’s goal of having a “critical mass” of minority students).
72. See id. at 330 (discussing the benefits of classroom diversity for both minority
and non-minority students).
73. See, e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich.,
652 F.3d 607, 618 (6th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that minorities are the primary targets of
affirmative action).
74. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 706 (9th Cir. 1997)
(noting that only a discriminatory reordering triggers the test).
75. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982)
(finding that the voter initiative halting desegregation took power from groups favoring
desegregation).
76. See id. (finding that citizens in favor of desegregation could only achieve that
by voter approval whereas those advocating for other educational reforms had a lesser
burden).
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of the state.77 For example, in Seattle the initiative preventing local school
boards from using busing and school reassignments moved the authority to
address desegregation from the local school boards to the state level.78
Where political power remains at the level of government where it has
traditionally been, there has been no reallocation of power within the
meaning of Hunter and Seattle.79
Hunter addressed a situation in which a voter initiative repealed an
antidiscrimination law requiring equal treatment.80 An amendment to
Akron, Ohio’s charter overturned a fair housing ordinance.81 In order to
invoke the protections of the ordinance, the amendment required that it first
be approved by a majority of Akron’s voters.82 A majority of voter
approval was only necessary to put into effect housing ordinances that
regulated real estate based on race, not real estate regulation ordinances
based on other factors, which troubled the Court.83
In Hunter, the amendment burdened African-Americans who wanted to
invoke the fair housing ordinance.84 Because the amendment only targeted
ordinances regulating property on the basis of race, it disadvantaged the
African-American minority by allowing the City of Akron to discriminate
against them by denying them equality in housing.85 The Court held that
the amendment made it more difficult for minorities to enact
antidiscrimination ordinances based on race because such legislation now
required a majority vote.86 Citizens wishing to enact antidiscrimination
ordinances based on some other metric, such as political affiliation or sex,
did not require a majority vote.87
77. See id. at 477 (concluding that such an upward transfer of power imposes
burdens on the minority).
78. See id. (noting that school boards usually had the power to make decisions
about education policy).
79. See id. (finding that the use of a “complex government structure” improperly
reallocates legislative power).
80. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 386 (1969) (suggesting that the purpose
of the ordinance was to provide equal housing opportunity).
81. See id. at 387 (noting that Ms. Hunter was unable to view homes for sale
because she was African-American).
82. See id. (mentioning that the amendment passed by a majority vote).
83. See id. at 389, 391 (finding that the amendment treated racial housing concerns
differently than other housing concerns, thereby disproportionately affecting minority
groups).
84. See id. at 391 (holding that the amendment was facially neutral as to race).
85. See id. (finding that the amendment placed “special burdens” on minorities).
86. See id. at 390 (noting that approval of the City Council sufficed to enact
ordinances not based on race).
87. See id. at 391 (listing other types of ordinances that could be passed without a
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Similar circumstances were at issue in Seattle.88 In Seattle, the school
district used busing and school reassignments to accelerate desegregation.89
Residents opposed to desegregation passed an initiative preventing school
boards from requiring students to attend schools other than those that were
closest to them.90 The Court found it impermissible that with passage of
the initiative, decisions about desegregation now had to be made by
appealing to the voters of the state to overturn the initiative while decisions
about other educational interests remained with local school boards, where
desegregation policies had typically been.91
The initiative in Seattle reallocated political power so as to burden the
African-American minority by removing from local school boards the
power to adopt desegregation policies.92 Individuals favoring integration
had to overturn the initiative by appealing to the Washington electorate.93
Comparatively, individuals desiring other educational policies unrelated to
integration need only petition the local school boards.94
3. Triggering Levels of Scrutiny Under the Traditional Approach and the
Hunter-Seattle Approach
The first step in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to
a challenged law is to identify the legislative classification at issue.95 Laws
that either use impermissible racial classifications under the traditional
approach or that obstruct minority access to the political processes under
the political structure approach trigger the application of strict scrutiny.96
Strict scrutiny mandates that laws must be narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest.97 The application of strict scrutiny does not
vote to illustrate why the amendment was discriminatory).
88. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 461 (1982)
(suggesting that the state’s goal was to equalize racially imbalanced schools).
89. See id. at 459-60, 60 n.2 (noting the anger over the slow pace of
desegregation).
90. See id. at 463 (noting that the initiative passed with sixty-six percent of the
vote).
91. See id. at 479 (characterizing the change in the decision-making process as
“major”).
92. See id. at 474 (noting that school boards had power over policies except
desegregation).
93. See id. (noting that desegregation is a racial issue).
94. See id. at 474 n.17 (referring to a comparative burden).
95. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (noting that the State may not
make one class of people unequal before the law).
96. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d 466, 489 (6th Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (using the Hunter-Seattle test to trigger strict scrutiny).
97. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (reiterating that strict
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automatically invalidate a law.98 As long as the government shows that its
use of race is necessary to advance a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored to do so, the law does not violate the Constitution.99
By contrast, laws that use neither a suspect racial classification nor
restructure political power trigger rational basis review.100 Under rational
basis, a legislative classification is valid as long as it is rationally related to
a legitimate government interest.101 Thus, unless a law uses a suspect
classification like race or alters the channels of political change, the law
will not trigger strict scrutiny and rational basis will apply.102
Rational basis is a highly deferential standard.103 However, courts
always require a showing of the link between the classification in the law
and the state interest at which that law is aimed.104 The link between the
classification and objective need only be average, not strong or compelling
as under strict scrutiny.105 If a court finds the requisite linkage between the
classification and objective, the law will be upheld as long as the state
interest is legitimate.106 The state interest need not be the best or most
efficient but need only be important in the eyes of the state.107
C. The Circuit Split: The Battle over Affirmative Action Bans
1. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents: Michigan’s Ban on
Affirmative Action Violates the Equal Protection Clause Under the HunterSeattle Doctrine
In Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the Sixth Circuit struck down

scrutiny applies to all racial classifications).
98. See id. at 327 (suggesting that applications of strict scrutiny could differ by
court).
99. See, e.g., id. (finding that strict scrutiny discerns the sincerity of the
government’s use of race).
100. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (noting that rational basis is consistent with
legislative reality).
101. See id. at 632 (noting that the government interest could have a weak
rationale).
102. See id. at 634 (noting that a desire to harm a group is not a legitimate state
interest under rational basis).
103. See id. at 632 (calling rational basis the “most deferential of standards”).
104. See id. (highlighting that an imprudent law could be upheld under rational
basis).
105. See id. (noting that the fit requirement delineates judicial authority and
discretion to strike down laws).
106. See id. (holding that the interest need not be compelling).
107. See id. (noting that states must know what laws they can pass).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss2/8

14

Bean: Have We Reached Grutter's "Logical End Point?" The Fight Over Sta

2014]

HAVE WE REACHED GRUTTER’S LOGICAL END POINT?

499

Proposal 2, which banned the use of affirmative action.108 Various
constituencies challenged Proposal 2 as an equal protection violation
because it made it more difficult for racial minorities to have their ethnic
origins taken into account.109 The district court concluded that Proposal 2
was constitutional because the state and its voters were free to ban
programs that advantage racial minorities without violating constitutional
requirements.110 A panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court because Proposal 2 improperly modified the admissions
processes at Michigan’s universities.111
Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit affirmed.112 Applying the HunterSeattle test, the court found that affirmative action programs have a racial
focus.113 The court held that affirmative action is a policy that makes up
part of the process of admissions, which the court called a political process
under the Hunter-Seattle test.114 The court then found that Proposal 2
reordered the admissions process to impose burdens on individuals
advocating for affirmative action programs compared to individuals who
wished to change other aspects of school admissions policies unrelated to
race, such as consideration of legacy or alumni connections.115
The majority found that the Hunter-Seattle test was met, thereby
triggering strict scrutiny.116 It reasoned that the laws repealed in Hunter
and Seattle were preferential just like the affirmative action programs

108. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d 466, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (noting Michigan’s long history with affirmative action litigation).
109. See id. at 472 (explaining that the litigation only applied to affirmative action
in education).
110. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 539
F. Supp. 2d. 924, 957, 960 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (holding that neither the traditional view
nor the Hunter-Seattle doctrine of equal protection invalidate Proposal 2).
111. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 652
F.3d 607, 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2011) (applying the Hunter-Seattle test to hold Proposal 2
unconstitutional).
112. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 489 (explaining that the
court need not consider the Plaintiffs’ claims under traditional equal protection
analysis).
113. See id. at 478 (equating affirmative action to busing and school reassignment
programs to satisfy the racial focus prong).
114. See id. at 481 (finding the sharp disagreement about whether admissions
policies are part of a “political process,” as that term was used in Hunter and Seattle).
115. See id. at 483-84 (noting that the only way to enact affirmative action
programs after Proposal 2 is to amend the Michigan Constitution).
116. See id. at 473 (framing the issue in terms of the political structure doctrine and
not in terms of Grutter’s holdings).
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repealed by Proposal 2.117 The many dissents argued that the HunterSeattle test was inapplicable because that doctrine only applies where the
laws repealed require equality, not policies like affirmative action, that
create inequality.118 The dissents focused on the distinction between the
repeal of laws that make it more difficult for minorities to gain protection
from discrimination and those that make it more difficult for minorities to
obtain preferential treatment.119 The dissents read Hunter and Seattle
narrowly not to apply to the latter situation.120 Because Proposal 2 makes it
more difficult for minorities to obtain preferential treatment, the HunterSeattle test was irrelevant.121
Given that Proposal 2 satisfied the Hunter-Seattle test, the majority
applied strict scrutiny.122 The Michigan Attorney General failed to argue
that Proposal 2 was supported by a compelling state interest.123 Thus,
Proposal 2 failed strict scrutiny and was found unconstitutional.124
2. Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson: State Affirmative Action Bans
Do Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause
In Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, the Ninth Circuit upheld
California’s Proposition 209 barring the use of affirmative action.125 The
court concluded that Proposition 209 was constitutional using the
traditional approach to equal protection.126 The court reasoned that if the
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to prohibit racial discrimination
then Proposition 209 achieves this goal by prohibiting all racial
classifications.127
117. See id. at 486 (calling the dissents’ characterizations “strained”).
118. See id. (viewing the repealed law in Seattle as preferential).
119. See id. at 496 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (noting that these two concepts are

profoundly different).
120. See id. at 498 (finding that affirmative action cannot be analyzed using the
Hunter-Seattle test).
121. See id. (noting that elimination of racial classifications is not barred by Hunter
and Seattle).
122. See id. at 489 (majority opinion) (noting that the Seattle Court did not apply
strict scrutiny).
123. See id. (declining to consider a compelling state interest).
124. See id. (noting that a compelling state interest may exist).
125. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 696-97, 709 (9th Cir.
1997) (highlighting that Proposition 209 passed by a margin of fifty-four to forty-six
percent).
126. See id. at 701 (finding Proposition 209 consistent with the equal protection
guarantee to end racial discrimination).
127. See id. at 702 (emphasizing that the language of Proposition 209 clearly
prohibits racial classifications).
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The court found Hunter and Seattle inapplicable.128 Relying on
Crawford, the court held that Proposition 209 functioned as a repeal of
racial legislation that was not required by the Constitution to begin with.129
Because such a repeal does not deny equal protection, Proposition 209 was
constitutional.130
III. ANALYSIS
A. In Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents, the Court Erred
in Applying the Hunter-Seattle Test to Strike Down Michigan’s Proposal 2
Because the Hunter-Seattle Test Was Not Satisfied.
The Sixth Circuit used the Hunter-Seattle political structure doctrine to
invalidate Proposal 2.131 However, the Hunter-Seattle test was not
triggered, and consequently strict scrutiny analysis should not have been
applied.132 First, Proposal 2 does not remove political power from the local
level of government to a higher level of government as required by Hunter
and Seattle.133 Second, Proposal 2 does not burden the interests of a racial
minority.134 Finally, because Proposal 2 does not condone discrimination
against minorities, the Hunter-Seattle test should not have been triggered,
and strict scrutiny should not have been applied.135 Thus, because Proposal
2 failed to satisfy the Hunter-Seattle test, strict scrutiny did not apply and
the Sixth Circuit’s invalidation of Proposal 2 under that level of scrutiny
was incorrect.136

128. See id. at 706 (distinguishing Hunter and Seattle from the current case by
reading them narrowly).
129. See id. at 709 (concluding that Crawford controls because the Hunter-Seattle
test was not triggered).
130. See id. (holding that Proposition 209 addresses racial issues neutrally).
131. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d 466, 488-89 (6th Cir. 2012)
(en banc) (holding that because Proposal 2 fails the Hunter-Seattle test it must pass
strict scrutiny).
132. See id. at 493 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (noting that the political structure
approach does not invalidate Proposal 2).
133. See id. at 498-99 (noting that Proposal 2 has not restricted the lawmaking
process).
134. See id. at 506 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (finding no burden on any group).
135. See id. at 501 (noting that Proposal 2 repeals a racial preference program).
136. But see id. at 489 (majority opinion) (finding that Proposal 2 fails strict
scrutiny and is therefore unconstitutional).
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1. Because Proposal 2 Does Not Reallocate Political Power from a Local
Legislative Body to a Higher Level of Government, the Hunter-Seattle Test
Was Not Satisfied.
The Hunter-Seattle test is implicated when political power is deliberately
shifted upward from a local legislative body to a higher level of
government.137 The test does not apply in circumstances where political
power remains where it has traditionally been.138 With regard to Proposal
2, the question is whether the power over university admissions policies
was moved to a higher level of government so as to trigger the application
of the Hunter-Seattle test.139
Proposal 2 has not removed decision-making authority over admissions
policies to a higher level of government because the power over
Michigan’s public universities has always been at the state level.140 This is
because the Michigan Constitution only confers authority on the boards of
Michigan’s public universities to run the schools.141 Thus, even though the
State has delegated authority to the boards, the ultimate power over
Michigan’s public universities still rests with the state whether in the
electorate or the legislature.142
The passage of Proposal 2 took the issues of state university admissions
policies, which have traditionally been lodged at the state level, and placed
them in the hands of the statewide electorate, which represents the entire
state.143 Given that authority over Michigan’s public universities and their
governance has always been at the state level, whether the state level is
defined as the legislature or the electorate, political power over admissions
decisions has not been shifted upward.144 Rather, the power over university
admissions policies remains exactly where it has always been: at the state
level.145 Thus, Proposal 2 did not trigger the Hunter-Seattle doctrine
137. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 483 (1982)
(referencing a “new and remote level of government”).
138. See id. at 480 (noting that the initiative moved power up to the state level).
139. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 498-99 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that Proposal 2 has not reallocated political power).
140. See MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (delegating the power of university
administration to school boards).
141. See id. (characterizing the boards as corporate bodies).
142. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 499 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (noting that all voters have a say in the electoral process).
143. See id. at 470 (majority opinion) (arguing that students seeking affirmative
action policies must amend the Michigan Constitution).
144. See id. at 504 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (noting that voters have no ability to
influence school board decisions).
145. See id. (equating the electorate with the legislature).
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because the power over university admissions policies was not subject to
removal to a higher level of government as required by the political
structure doctrine.146
2. Because Proposal 2 Does Not Burden the Interests of a Defined Minority
Group, the Hunter-Seattle Test Was Not Satisfied.
The Hunter-Seattle test requires that challenged legislation burden the
interests of a minority group.147 In both Hunter and Seattle, the burden fell
on racial minorities, particularly African-Americans.148 The Court did not
hold in either of those cases that a piece of challenged legislation must
specifically burden a racial minority in order to comply with the political
structure doctrine.149 Nevertheless, in both instances the Court did identify
discrete minority groups that suffered a burden, suggesting that there must
be, at the very least, some identifiable group that is burdened by the
challenged legislation.150
Proposal 2 does not burden a minority interest consistent with Hunter
and Seattle.151 To locate the burden imposed by Proposal 2, the majority
compared two hypothetical groups: citizens attempting to institute
affirmative action programs and citizens attempting to institute any other
policy not affected by Proposal 2, like a policy that would give special
consideration to family legacies or other such connections.152 Citizens
seeking adoption of affirmative action programs must amend the Michigan
Constitution in order to vitiate the effects of Proposal 2.153 Citizens
seeking other admissions policies, such as consideration of legacy
connections, have the comparatively easier burden of petitioning university
officials.154
146. See id. (emphasizing that the electorate was the only level of government at
which these decisions could be made).
147. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969) (referring specifically
to racial minorities).
148. See, e.g., id. at 387 (noting that Ms. Hunter was African-American).
149. See, e.g., id. at 391 (citing other minority groups that could have been
burdened but were not).
150. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 474 (1982)
(referring specifically to racial or ethnic groups, not simply an undefined minority).
151. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 506 (en banc) (Sutton, J.,
dissenting) (finding no reasonable way of locating a burden).
152. See id. at 483-84 (majority opinion) (defending the concept of a comparative
structural burden among groups).
153. See id. at 484 (noting that constitutional amendment is the sole recourse to
enact affirmative action programs).
154. See id. (outlining other avenues available in addition to petitioning the school
board).
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Though the majority’s rationale that a burden does exist for individuals
seeking the adoption of affirmative action plans is tenable, its logic fails to
specifically identify the minority group that is burdened and thus, does not
comply with the narrow reading afforded to Hunter or Seattle.155 By
referring only to a hypothetical citizen, or group of citizens, who must
crusade for adoption of affirmative action programs, the majority assumes
without explanation that these individuals constitute a minority of the
Michigan population.156 However, both Hunter and Seattle identified
discrete minority groups, African-Americans, who were disadvantaged by
the challenged voter initiatives and the laws they repealed.157 Thus, the
failure of the en banc majority to pinpoint exactly which group Proposal 2
disadvantages does not comply with Hunter and Seattle.158
Moreover, the majority’s failure to identify a burdened minority group
rests on the fact that Proposal 2 actually burdens no one.159 By its own
words, Proposal 2 prohibits discrimination or preferential treatment of
individuals based on race.160 By contrast, the charter amendment at issue in
Hunter allowed the state to engage in racial discrimination by subjecting
only the issue of racial discrimination in housing to a more rigorous
process of enforcement than other types of housing discrimination.161 The
overall effect of the Hunter amendment made it such that racial minorities,
like African-Americans, had to work harder than other groups to achieve
equal treatment.162
3. Because the Hunter-Seattle Test Applies Only to Laws Condoning
Discrimination Against Minorities, It Was Not Satisfied.
Hunter and Seattle attempted to remedy the inequalities created by
legislation that had the effect of permitting the state to discriminate against
155. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969) (noting that the
amendment only burdened African-Americans).
156. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 484 (opining on the
burdens of the “now-exhausted citizen”).
157. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 476-77 (1982)
(emphasizing that a “particular” group of individuals must be burdened).
158. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 492 (Boggs, J., dissenting)
(discussing the majority’s extension of the Hunter-Seattle test).
159. See id. at 506 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (struggling to locate burdens on racial
minorities and suggesting that no burden exists).
160. See id. (arguing that a ban on racial discrimination is an unusual way to burden
a specific group).
161. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 390 (1969) (noting that no expedited
election mechanism was available to address racial housing matters).
162. See id. at 389 (finding that the charter did not convey a positive right to
discriminate).
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minorities, not legislation that prevented the state from discriminating
against minorities.163 For example, in Hunter, the requirement of a
majority vote of the city’s electorate to enforce a fair housing ordinance
allowed the city to discriminate against its African-American population by
making it harder for them to obtain freedom from discrimination in housing
when that discrimination was based solely on their race.164 Thus, the
Hunter-Seattle doctrine is triggered in the narrow factual circumstances
where the challenged legislation permits the State to engage in
discrimination against minorities.165 Consequently, the Hunter-Seattle
doctrine is not triggered where a piece of challenged legislation expressly
prohibits the State from favoring minority groups.166
Michigan’s Proposal 2 did not trigger the Hunter-Seattle test because its
effect is not to allow the state to discriminate against any minority group.167
This becomes clear by examining the policy targeted by Proposal 2 and the
language of the legislation itself.168 First, the existing policy affected by
Proposal 2 is affirmative action, a preferential treatment program.169 The
Supreme Court acknowledges that affirmative action programs are
exceptions to the Equal Protection Clause because they permit
discrimination by allowing the State to prefer one group to another.170
Applying this rationale, the policy that Proposal 2 targets is one that
permits discrimination in the context of university admissions.171 By
contrast, the targets of the challenged legislation in Hunter and Seattle were
laws that prohibited discrimination.172
163. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 461 (1982)
(implying that by cancelling the desegregation program, the State could continue the
discriminatory practice of segregation); see also Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387 (noting that
the target of the amendment was a fair housing ordinance that required the State to treat
all citizens equally in housing matters).
164. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389 (highlighting that only racial housing was
affected).
165. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 512 (Griffin, J.,
dissenting) (remarking on the infrequent use of the political structure doctrine).
166. See id. at 506 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (showing that Proposal 2 prohibits
Michigan from engaging in discrimination).
167. See id. at 510 (emphasizing that Proposal 2 removes preferential treatment).
168. See generally id. (analyzing affirmative action and its relation to Proposal 2).
169. See id. at 471 (majority opinion) (noting that Proposal 2 appears under the
heading “Affirmative Action” in the Michigan Constitution).
170. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (using the term “racial
preferences” to describe race-conscious admissions policies like affirmative action).
171. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 491 (Boggs, J., dissenting)
(referring to affirmative action policies as “racial discrimination”).
172. See, e.g., id. at 510 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (showing that Hunter removed an
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That Proposal 2 does not condone discrimination consistent with the
Hunter-Seattle doctrine can also be found by looking to the language of the
amendment.173 Proposal 2 states that Michigan “shall not discriminate . . .
or grant preferential treatment” on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, or
national origin.174 Though the language is clear, the prohibition against
engaging in discrimination or granting preferential treatment shows that
Michigan has unequivocally barred such treatment and not condoned it.175
Hunter and Seattle struck down the legislation at issue in those cases
because they permitted the state to discriminate, not because they prevented
discrimination.176 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit’s use of those cases to
invalidate Proposal 2 was inappropriate given the stark differences between
the characteristics and functions of the legislation struck down in Hunter
and Seattle compared to the characteristics and functions of the legislation
struck down by the Sixth Circuit.177
B. Because the Hunter-Seattle Test Has Narrow Applicability, the Court
Should Have Used the Traditional Approach to Equal Protection,
Triggering Rational Basis Under Which Proposal 2 Is Constitutional.
The majority’s reliance on the Hunter-Seattle approach to the Equal
Protection Clause led the court to invalidate Proposal 2.178 Because of this,
the majority chose not to apply the traditional approach to the equal
protection doctrine.179 The court should have analyzed Proposal 2 under a
traditional approach to equal protection because the Hunter-Seattle test
only applies to legislative enactments that repeal antidiscrimination laws or
other laws aimed at securing equality.180
Under traditional equal protection analysis, the central purpose of the
antidiscrimination law and not a law that permitted discrimination).
173. See id. at 471-72 (majority opinion) (arguing that Proposal 2 prevents state
schools from considering adoption of affirmative action).
174. See id. at 471 (noting that affirmative action policies had been in place for
almost fifty years in Michigan).
175. See id. at 510 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (referring to Proposal 2 as “neutral”).
176. See id. (noting that the laws invalidated in Hunter and Seattle afforded the
State a positive right to discriminate).
177. See id. at 495-96 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (discussing why the Hunter-Seattle
doctrine does not control based on the language of Proposal 2).
178. See id. at 513 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority deemed
traditional equal protection inapplicable).
179. See id. at 489 (majority opinion) (summarizing why traditional equal
protection principles were inapplicable).
180. See id. at 513 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s decision to
eschew traditional equal protection analysis given the Hunter-Seattle test’s limited
applicability).
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Equal Protection Clause is to prevent the use of racial classifications that
often lead to racial discrimination and other undesirable social
consequences.181 Analysis under this theory asks whether a challenged law
distinguishes between individuals on the basis of a suspect classification
like race.182 If the law does not make use of a suspect classification, it is
subject to rational basis review.183
Had the majority analyzed Proposal 2 using the traditional approach to
equal protection, it would have found that Proposal 2 draws no distinctions
on the basis of a suspect classification like race.184 Due to the lack of a
suspect classification, strict scrutiny was not triggered and rational basis
should have been applied.185 Consequently, under the deferential rational
basis standard, Proposal 2 is constitutional because its prohibition against
racial discrimination and racial preferences is rationally related to the
state’s legitimate interest in eliminating racial discrimination.186
1. Because Proposal 2 Prohibits Racial Discrimination, It Does Not Draw
a Racial Classification That Triggers Strict Scrutiny.
Laws that use a suspect classification like race as a means of legislative
distinction automatically trigger strict scrutiny.187 Laws that do not use a
suspect classification are subject to rational basis review and must be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.188 Thus, the first step in
determining the appropriate level of scrutiny under which to evaluate a
challenged law is to determine the nature of the classification at issue.189
Proposal 2 does not distinguish between individuals or groups through
the use of a suspect classification such as race and is consequently subject
181. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (holding that racial
classifications do not reflect legitimate public concerns or interests).
182. See, e.g., Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997)
(noting that suspect classifications must survive strict scrutiny).
183. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (suggesting that not all
laws will automatically incur strict scrutiny).
184. See Wilson, 122 F.3d at 702 (noting that a bar on racial classifications is not a
racial classification).
185. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 504 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that Proposal 2 easily satisfies rational basis review).
186. See id. at 508 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the passage of Proposal 2
reflects a decision of Michigan’s electorate to end preferential treatment programs).
187. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995)
(holding that any use of race automatically triggers strict scrutiny).
188. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (noting that most laws classify individuals in
some way).
189. See id. at 633 (suggesting that legislative classifications often reference a
single trait like race).
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to rational basis review.190 Proposal 2 clearly states that Michigan may not
discriminate against individuals on the basis of race or a limited list of
other personal characteristics.191
Proposal 2 is not a racial classification. By barring discrimination and
preferential treatment, the state is legally foreclosed from preferring one
group on the basis of race, thus forcing the state to treat all citizens equally
without regard for race.192 As the Ninth Circuit deftly observed in
Coalition for Economic Equity, “a law that prohibits the State from
classifying individuals by race . . . does not classify individuals by race.”193
Therefore, Proposal 2 does not use a suspect classification that would
trigger strict scrutiny.194 Because Proposal 2 fails to meet the threshold
requirements to trigger strict scrutiny, it need only pass the rational basis
standard.195
2. Eliminating Distinctions Based on Race Is a Legitimate State Interest.
Rational basis review first requires that there be a legitimate state interest
to support the classification made by the law at issue.196 The state interest
does not need to be compelling, as under strict scrutiny, nor does it need to
be the wisest or most important interest.197 Due to the highly deferential
nature of rational basis, the interest need only be legitimate in the eyes of
the state.198
The state interest advanced by Proposal 2 is Michigan’s interest in
eliminating racial distinctions and preferential treatment.199 Because
Proposal 2 was the subject of a statewide vote that was subsequently
190. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 504 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (noting the lack of racial classification such that only rational basis is
triggered).
191. See id. at 471 (majority opinion) (listing other characteristics excluded from
the reach of Proposal 2).
192. See id. at 510 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (stating that Proposal 2 places all
individuals on a the same level).
193. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir. 1997)
(emphasizing the legal effect of a prohibition on discrimination).
194. See, e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 504 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Proposal 2 requires no heightened scrutiny).
195. See, e.g., id. (engaging in rational basis review absent the need for more
stringent review).
196. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (noting that the state
determines whether the interest is legitimate).
197. See id. (postulating that an “unwise” law could survive).
198. See id. (requiring deference to state objectives).
199. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 508 (Sutton, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that Proposal 2 was the state’s mechanism for ending racial preferences).
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approved through the voting process, it follows that a majority of the
Michigan electorate favored the initiative and its underlying premise to end
racial discrimination and preferential treatment.200 Thus, as the principal
political authority of the state, the Michigan electorate affirmed its interest
in and commitment to ending racial discrimination through the passage of
Proposal 2.201
The legitimacy of Michigan’s interest in ending racial distinctions and
preferential treatment is grounded in the notion that the purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause is to eliminate government-sanctioned
discrimination on the basis of race.202 Given the clarity with which the
Supreme Court has articulated that the central focus of the Equal Protection
Clause is to end state-imposed racial discrimination, it follows that state
initiatives that aim to accomplish that goal and have the effect of doing so
are legitimate such that the “legitimate state interest” prong of the rational
basis test is satisfied.203 Thus, because Proposal 2 reflects a collective
decision by the Michigan electorate, the highest political authority of the
state, to end racial discrimination and because that interest is well
supported by Supreme Court doctrine, the state interest advanced by
Proposal 2 satisfies the “legitimate state interest” prong of the rational basis
standard.204
3. Proposal 2 Is Rationally Related to the State Interest of Eliminating
Distinctions Based on Race.
That a law is grounded in a legitimate government interest does not end
the application of the rational basis inquiry because the proposed law must
have some relationship or connection to the achievement of the asserted
state interest.205 Put differently, the law or classification at issue must be
the means through which the asserted government interest is achieved.206
Thus, a court considering the relationship between the state interest

200. See id. at 471 (majority opinion) (discussing the passage of Proposal 2 by a
fifty-eight to forty-two percent margin).
201. See id. at 491-92 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (outlining Michigan’s historical path
to equality legislation).
202. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (noting that racial
classifications create racial tension).
203. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 514 (Griffin, J.,
dissenting) (viewing bans on racial preferences as consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment).
204. See id. at 513 (suggesting that racial neutrality in a law is a legitimate interest).
205. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (noting that the link
between the state interest and the measure is the crux of rational basis).
206. See id. (emphasizing that the law must advance the legislative interest).
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advanced by Proposal 2 and the means through which that interest is
achieved need only find some relationship, regardless of how small,
between the two.207
The state interest that Proposal 2 seeks to accomplish is an end to racial
preferences and racial discrimination.208 The means through which that end
is to be pursued is through Proposal 2.209 Proposal 2 explicitly emphasizes
that the state “shall not discriminate” on the basis of race.210 A plain
reading of the amendment’s language reveals that its effect is to prohibit
the state from discriminating, not to allow the state to do so.211 Thus, the
question of satisfying rational basis now becomes whether a prohibition on
the use of racial discrimination is rationally related to the state interest in
eliminating racial discrimination.212
If a state’s interest is coterminous with the means through which that
interest is achieved, the “rational relationship” prong of the rational basis
test is satisfied.213 Proposal 2 has a rational relationship to Michigan’s
interest in ending racial preferences and discrimination because that interest
is directly aligned with the means being used to achieve that interest.214 If
Michigan’s goal is to eliminate all racial discrimination, then Proposal 2 is
rationally related to that interest because the state cannot, as a matter of
law, discriminate on the basis of race.215 After the passage of Proposal 2,
the State cannot prefer one group of individuals to another or otherwise
discriminate against a certain group, thus achieving the state interest in
Because there is some discernible
eliminating discrimination.216
relationship between Michigan’s interests and the means through which
207. See id. at 633 (explaining that the fit inquiry ensures that laws are not drawn to
discriminate against a group).
208. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 508 (Sutton, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the “people of Michigan” chose to end racial preferences).
209. See generally id. at 471-72 (majority opinion) (discussing how Proposal 2
altered affirmative action in Michigan).
210. See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26(2) (listing sex, color, ethnicity, and national
origin as other affected classes).
211. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 504 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Proposal 2 is neutral).
212. See id. (applying rational basis but not discussing it).
213. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (suggesting that a
narrowly-drawn law closely related to the state interest satisfies rational basis).
214. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 504 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a court should not question the motives of the electorate in
changing laws).
215. See id. at 514 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Proposal 2 actually
enshrines equality values into the Michigan Constitution).
216. See id. at 513 (equating discrimination with the idea of preference).
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those interests are achieved, Proposal 2 satisfies the second prong of the
rational basis standard.217
C. Because the Traditional Approach Holds That the “Mere Repeal” of
Race-Conscious Legislation Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause,
the Ninth Circuit Reached the Correct Conclusion in Wilson, and Because
Proposal 2 Functions as a “Mere Repeal,” It Is Constitutional.
In Coalition for Economic Equity, the Ninth Circuit chose not to apply
the Hunter-Seattle approach to equal protection.218 The court chose instead
to decide the case on the standard set in Crawford v. Board of Education.219
Crawford holds that when the State repeals existing legislation dealing with
race that is not required by the Constitution and without removing the
power of the State or its citizens to reinstate those laws, that repeal is not an
invalid racial classification that violates the Equal Protection Clause.220
The Ninth Circuit used Crawford as the basis on which to hold California’s
Proposition 209 constitutional because it functioned only as a repeal of
California’s affirmative action plans without taking further steps to
disadvantage any particular group.221 Like California’s Proposition 209,
Michigan’s Proposal 2 also functions as a “mere repeal” under the
Crawford standard because it allows Michigan voters to reinstate
affirmative action policies by appealing to the statewide electorate and
because affirmative action policies are not constitutionally required in the
first place.222
1. Proposal 2 Is a “Mere Repeal” Because the Citizens of Michigan May
Still Reinstate Affirmative Action Policies.
Under Crawford, if the State repeals legislation that touches on race but
still permits the citizens of that state or the state government to somehow

217. See, e.g., id. at 493 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (using the traditional approach to
trigger rational basis and thereby finding Proposal 2 constitutional under that
approach).
218. See Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 706 (9th Cir. 1997)
(reasoning that Hunter and Seattle must be read narrowly).
219. See id. (declining to adopt the Plaintiffs’ expansive reading of Hunter and
Seattle).
220. See Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 537-38 (1982) (noting the
constitutionality of neutral race-related laws).
221. See generally Wilson, 122 F.3d at 705 (discussing why Crawford applies under
the facts of Wilson).
222. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 514 (Griffin, J.,
dissenting) (applauding the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Crawford in lieu of the HunterSeattle test).
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reestablish those policies, there is no equal protection violation.223
Consequently, unless there is no feasible way to reinstate the repealed laws,
the Equal Protection Clause has not been violated by the repeal alone.224
Because Proposal 2 leaves open the possibility of reinstating the policies it
repealed, there is no equal protection violation under Crawford.225
Proposal 2 eliminated Michigan’s affirmative action programs in a
statewide election in which all parties had the right to participate.226
Neither the majority nor the dissenting opinions in Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action disagreed on this point.227 The fact that a vote occurred
does not mean that Michigan can never reinstate those policies.228 Rather,
to the same extent that Michigan repealed its affirmative action programs
through a vote, it can reinstate those programs by putting another initiative
reinstating affirmative action policies before the Michigan electorate for a
vote.229 Because the possibility of a vote exists and is a means through
which Michigan may reinstate its affirmative action policies, Michigan did
not forever remove the power of Michigan’s voters to reinstate those
policies.230 Therefore, under Crawford, Proposal 2 functions solely as a
repeal of race-based legislation.231
2. Proposal 2 Is a “Mere Repeal” Because Affirmative Action Policies Are
Not Required by the Constitution.
In addition to the proposition that the repeal of race-based legislation
does not offend the Equal Protection Clause if channels for reinstatement
remain open, Crawford also specified that if the policy being repealed is
not one required by the Constitution to begin with, then its repeal does not
223. See, e.g., Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539 (holding that states must have the
flexibility to achieve diversity).
224. See id. at 541 (noting that the states need not legislate beyond constitutional
requirements).
225. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 470 (emphasizing that
Michigan residents could “repeal” the effects of Proposal 2 if they so desired).
226. See, e.g., id. at 499 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (noting that majority and minority
voices were entitled to participate).
227. See, e.g., id. at 471 (majority opinion) (referring to the “Michigan voters”).
228. See id. at 505 (Sutton, J., dissenting) (characterizing the enactment of Proposal
2 as an electoral choice).
229. See id. at 506 (suggesting that a vote or constitutional amendment are available
to Michigan residents).
230. See id. at 488 (majority opinion) (noting that voters may lobby for affirmative
action policies either way).
231. See Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 540 (1982) (highlighting that
legislation must significantly alter channels for reinstatement to violate the Equal
Protection Clause).
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constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.232 This idea is
supported by the notion that states should be given maximum flexibility to
eliminate bad laws, to adopt new or different laws, and to experiment with
different governance schemes.233 Thus, when a state adopts a policy that is
not required by the Federal Constitution, it is free to recede from that
policy without violating the Equal Protection Clause.234
A court examining Michigan’s Proposal 2 through the Crawford lens
would look to the policy that is being repealed and then decide whether that
policy is constitutionally required to determine whether the repeal is
constitutional.235 First, the policy that Proposal 2 repeals is affirmative
action.236 Second, affirmative action is not required by the Constitution
because it is an exception to the baseline rule of equality embodied by the
Equal Protection Clause.237 It follows that the repeal of affirmative action
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause under the Crawford
standard.238
Affirmative action programs are not required by the Constitution because
they are judicially-granted exceptions to the Equal Protection Clause,
currently allowed by the Supreme Court, and which are only constitutional
within narrowly defined contours and the permissive language of Court.239
As the Supreme Court held in Grutter, an interest in diversity “can justify”
the use of affirmative action programs.240 The Court’s use of the
permissive word “can” suggests that states are not required to adopt
affirmative action programs, only that they may do so if they believe that
their institutions are somehow deficient in diversity.241
232. See id. at 535 (finding that busing was not constitutionally required in the first
place).
233. See id. at 539 (allowing states wide latitude in their internal governance within
the boundaries of the Constitution).
234. See id. at 540 (arguing that it would be unjust to require a state to maintain
legislation that it was not required to pass).
235. See, e.g., Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 709 (9th Cir. 1997)
(noting the distinction between what the Constitution permits and requires).
236. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (highlighting that Proposal 2 explicitly used the words “Affirmative Action”).
237. See, e.g., id. at 494 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (arguing that affirmative action is
presumptively invalid and not required).
238. See Wilson, 122 F.3d at 709 (noting that permitting something is different than
requiring it).
239. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 506 (Sutton, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that racial preferences are “barely” constitutional).
240. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (holding that diversity is a
compelling state interest).
241. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 513 (Gibbons, J.,
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s temporal limitations on affirmative
action programs show that they are not required by the Constitution.242 As
stated in Grutter, the goal of eliminating the use of race and racial
discrimination necessarily requires that any existing uses of race be
eliminated.243 This goal can be achieved by requiring that schools include
sunset provisions and engage in periodic reviews of their affirmative action
programs.244 Consequently, it makes little sense to say that a policy like
affirmative action is constitutionally required when the Supreme Court has
already clearly instructed both that the policy must end in the future and,
more persuasively, that it is not required by the Constitution.245 Therefore,
because the affirmative action programs repealed by Proposal 2 are not
required by the Constitution to begin with, the repeal of those programs
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause under the standard articulated
in Crawford.246
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION
While the Hunter-Seattle approach to the Equal Protection Clause is not
often invoked, there are at least two persuasive reasons to support the
argument that the continued use of the doctrine should be discouraged.247
First, it appears to be at odds with current Supreme Court doctrine favoring
the elimination of all programs that confer racial preferences.248 Second, it
potentially hinders fundamental beliefs about the legitimacy of voting and
the democratic process.249 Accordingly, the Supreme Court should reverse
the Sixth Circuit’s decision and declare that the Hunter-Seattle test was
inapplicable under those facts.250
dissenting) (analyzing the impact of the holdings of Grutter).
242. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (suggesting that affirmative action will soon
be obsolete and unnecessary).
243. See id. (referring to the sunset provisions as required, not discretionary).
244. See id. (noting that the good faith of university administrators in ending
affirmative action is presumed).
245. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 511 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the choice to end affirmative action ultimately rests with the
states).
246. See, e.g., Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 542 (1982) (suggesting that
states need not align their laws to the Constitution in all respects).
247. See, e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 512 (Griffin, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the Hunter-Seattle doctrine as “ill-advised”).
248. See id. at 494-95 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (noting that recent decisions on
affirmative action are analytically critical).
249. See id. at 513 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (referring to the democratic process as
“necessary” to state governance).
250. See id. at 504 (finding no reason why traditional Equal Protection analysis
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A. Continued Application of the Hunter-Seattle Test Ignores Current
Supreme Court Doctrine Dictating That All Such Programs Must End
When No Longer Needed.
With the Supreme Court’s dual decisions in Grutter and Gratz, the Court
showed a clear proclivity toward the eventual elimination of affirmative
action when it was no longer needed.251 The Supreme Court based its
conviction on the notion that the Equal Protection Clause, if it is to have
any substance at all, is meant to eliminate discrimination based on race.252
The Court has given gravitas to its belief by requiring all affirmative action
programs to end in the future through the use of sunset provisions and
periodic reviews by governing school boards.253 If the courts continue to
embrace the Hunter-Seattle doctrine in the same robust manner as the Sixth
Circuit did and use it to invalidate state law bans on affirmative action, then
state governments and the courts will be acting in contravention of the
Supreme Court’s clear mandate by allowing affirmative action programs to
persist.254
Further, the Hunter-Seattle test makes it easier to sidestep the Supreme
Court’s decision in Grutter.255 Instead of looking substantively at whether
a legislative classification actually uses a racial classification, as under the
traditional approach, under the Hunter-Seattle test, the courts presume that
any shift in the political process automatically creates an invalid racial
classification.256 Not all racial classifications are invalid, only those that
are not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest under strict
scrutiny.257 Thus, to the extent that the Hunter-Seattle doctrine makes it
easier to invalidate state law bans on affirmative action, its use should be
discouraged.258
would not suffice).
251. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that the use of race
is not prohibited but that it is not also required).
252. See id. at 342 (suggesting that even compelling uses of race may not survive in
the future).
253. See id. (highlighting that school officials recognize that affirmative action
should be limited in duration).
254. See, e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 512 (Griffin, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Hunter-Seattle doctrine was created long after the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
255. See id. (noting that the Hunter-Seattle test requires a strong judicial
presumption in favor of finding a racial classification).
256. See id. at 512-13 (suggesting that Hunter and Seattle did not use a racial
classification).
257. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (requiring courts to analyze
the specific circumstances necessitating affirmative action).
258. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 512 (Griffin, J.,
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B. By Nullifying State Legislation Passed by the Electorate, the HunterSeattle Doctrine Thwarts the Democratic Process.
Dissenting in Seattle, Justice Powell expressed dismay at the Court’s
intrusion into the structure of state government through its use of the
political structure doctrine.259 Justice Powell grounded his disdain in the
notion that the Hunter-Seattle doctrine curtails the freedom of the states to
structure matters of internal governance free from interference by the
courts, a longstanding bulwark for the benefit of the states against
encroachments on their autonomy.260 Further, Justice Powell suggested
that the use of the Hunter-Seattle doctrine directly challenged the authority
of the state’s electorate to pass laws, thus hindering the democratic
process.261
To some extent, Justice Powell’s concerns manifested themselves in the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,
suggesting that his skepticism was well placed.262 Relying on the HunterSeattle doctrine, the majority invalidated Proposal 2.263 Upon closer
inspection, however, the court not only invalidated the measure but actually
overturned the otherwise valid result of Michigan’s democratic
processes.264
Justice Powell found this kind of judicial overreaching into the
democratic processes of the states troubling because unless the states
disobey the Constitution, their legislative judgments must be left intact.265
Thus, the Hunter-Seattle test has the potential to intrude on the power of
the states and, more importantly, their electorates, by invalidating
legislative enactments that otherwise comply with the Federal
dissenting) (discussing why the Hunter-Seattle doctrine is inconsistent with equal
protection principles).
259. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 489 (1982) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (referring to the intrusion as “unprecedented”).
260. See id. (noting the freedom afforded to states in structuring legislative and
judicial functions).
261. See id. at 496 (arguing that voters may always try to preempt locally-adopted
policies by appealing to the legislature).
262. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 513 (Griffin, J.,
dissenting) (vigorously defending Justice Powell’s dissent in Seattle for his assertion
that the Hunter-Seattle test “unconstitutionally suspends” the democratic process).
263. See id. at 489 n.10 (majority opinion) (noting that Proposal 2 is only invalid as
applied to education).
264. See, e.g., id. at 490 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the citizens of
Michigan were responsible for Proposal 2).
265. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 491 (1982) (Powell,
J., dissenting) (arguing that in the absence of a constitutional violation the courts
should not intervene).
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Constitution.266 Consequently, use of the Hunter-Seattle doctrine should be
curtailed to prevent such distortions of state democratic processes.267
V. CONCLUSION
The future of affirmative action in the United States remains unresolved,
but the decision in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action reinvigorates the
debate by addressing state law bans on those programs.268 The Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Fisher v. University of Texas showed the Court’s
continuing commitment to the principles articulated in Grutter.269 With the
Supreme Court’s review of Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action well
underway, this Comment has argued that the Court should reverse that
decision.270 Though the question of whether the Hunter-Seattle test applied
in Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action should continue to be used
remains an open question in the courts and the scholarship, the Court
should seriously consider its potential pitfalls when reviewing the decision
of the Sixth Circuit.271 In his dissent in Coalition to Defend Affirmative
Action, Judge Griffin certainly opened the door for the Supreme Court to
overrule the Hunter-Seattle doctrine when he, somewhat ominously, urged
the Court to “consign [the] misguided doctrine to the annals of judicial
history.”272
At the least, the Court must review the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and declare that the Hunter-Seattle
test was not triggered under those facts, thereby affirming the Ninth
Circuit’s decision.273 Further, this Comment suggests that the Court should
266. See id. (holding that race-neutral policies do not violate the Constitution).
267. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 505 (Sutton, J., dissenting)

(noting that affirmative action programs themselves often stem from a democratic
process).
268. See id. at 473 (majority opinion) (attempting but failing to distinguish Grutter
from the instant case suggesting a similarity between the two).
269. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) (emphasizing that
Bakke, Grutter, and Gratz are the cases upon which analysis of the University of Texas
admissions policy must turn).
270. See supra Part III (illustrating why Proposal 2 does not trigger strict scrutiny
and why it is constitutional under rational basis review).
271. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 509 (Sutton, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Hunter-Seattle doctrine unfairly insulates one side of any debate on
matters of policy and political fairness); see also supra Part IV (discussing potential
drawbacks of continued invocation of the Hunter-Seattle test).
272. See id. at 512 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (characterizing the Hunter-Seattle
doctrine as an anomaly lacking any constitutional basis).
273. See Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 514 (Griffin, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the circuit split results in doctrinal muddiness that the
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instead analyze Proposal 2 under the Court’s precedent embracing the
broad traditional approach to equal protection because it ultimately
survives constitutional scrutiny under that approach and because that
analysis does not overturn the valid result of a state referendum.274 Should
the Court choose to rule more broadly and overrule Hunter and Seattle,
there are plausible reasons for doing so, though a more in-depth analysis of
those reasons should be undertaken.275 Certainly, the infrequent invocation
of the Hunter-Seattle doctrine is strong preliminary evidence of a judicial
distaste for the doctrine and perhaps suggests more fundamental concerns
about its precarious position in the law of equal protection.276
Putting aside doctrinal or political concerns, from a purely analytic
standpoint, state law bans on affirmative action appear to be consistent with
the Court’s principles articulated in Grutter and reaffirmed in Fisher.277
This is because their effect is to bring such programs to an end, which is
precisely what Grutter envisioned by requiring sunset provisions and
forecasting a twenty-five year lifespan on existing affirmative action
programs.278 Thus, whatever may be said about the merits or pitfalls of the
under-used Hunter-Seattle doctrine, there remains the persuasive argument
that when a state chooses, through the democratic process, to repeal
affirmative action policies, which are presumptively invalid but only
narrowly permitted, the state acts in compliance with the Equal Protection
Clause and the current posture of the Supreme Court.279

majority should have avoided).
274. See supra Part III.B (discussing how the traditional approach triggers rational
basis under which Proposal 2 is constitutional); see also Coal. to Defend Affirmative
Action, 701 F.3d at 511 (noting that the majority’s decision is hard to reconcile with the
Equal Protection Clause).
275. See, e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 496 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that equal protection doctrine has evolved since Hunter and
Seattle).
276. See id. at 512 (Griffin, J., dissenting) (pointing to the fact that only three cases
had used the Hunter-Seattle doctrine before the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action and that two of those cases were Hunter and Seattle
themselves).
277. See id. at 493 (Boggs, J., dissenting) (arguing that invalidation of Proposal 2 is
inconsistent with “general constitutional law”).
278. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (implying that in
twenty-five years the United States will undergo a societal shift rendering affirmative
action inapt).
279. See, e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 701 F.3d at 492 (Boggs, J.,
dissenting) (calling the principles underlying Proposal 2 “laudable”).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss2/8

34

